Who Adopted Expanded Password System and for What
A telecom company who built a payment system designed for a million online shoppers adopted Expanded Password System (EPS) for accepting ‘Hard-to-Forget’ and yet ‘Hard-to-Break’ credentials and for reducing the helpdesk cost drastically. Actually 140,000 online shoppers enjoyed the no friction login before the payment system was closed in 2008.
An IT corporation who built a security-conscious corporate network adopted EPS deployed in 2-channel/2-factor scheme for accepting ‘Very Hard-to-Break’ and yet ‘Hard-to-Forget’ credentials. 1,200 employees are still enjoying the good balance of security and usability.
Japan’s Self-Defense Ground Forces, aka Army, adopted our product for accepting ‘Panic-Proof’ and yet ‘Hard-to-Break’ credentials. The number of licenses has increased more than 10-fold over the 7-year period from 2013 and is set to increase further.
We expect to see similar adoptions in hundreds or thousands of times larger scale once we start the operation in the global market from the headquarters in UK.
People in identity management appear to be busy discussing 'Security-First Approach’ and ‘Convenience-First Approach'. We would like to say ‘Wait a minute! Those discussions could be valid only where citizens are given a means to get themselves somehow authenticated in the first place. Where it is not the case, there would be no ‘Security-First’ nor ‘Convenience-First'.
We believe that it is the obligation of democratic societies to provide citizens with identity authentication measures that are practicable in emergencies as well as in everyday life.
- Can we presume that no citizens trapped in emergencies would ever lose any cards?
- Can we presume that no citizens trapped in emergencies would ever be injured?
- Can we presume that every citizen trapped in emergencies would ever be settled and calm?
We could suggest ‘Availability-First Model' as a subject to be considered before further discussing ‘Security-First’ and ‘Convenience-First'. It could be broken into three sub-models as follows.
At the top layer should there be a sub-model that is practicable when we have lost the identity card and the likes.
- ‘Deployment of a secret credential’ and ‘Deployment of biometrics with a fallback secret credential’ would suffice. (It must be noted that security of the latter is lower than the former because the biometrics and a fallback secret credential must be used together in a security-lowering ‘multi-entrance’ deployment, while convenience of the latter is generally better than the former.)
Beneath it, there should be a sub-model that is practicable when we possess no physical certificate and are injured.
- We can rely on the secret credential.
At the bottom layer, there should be a sub-model that is practicable when we are naked, injured and panicked.
- We need to rely on the deployment of secret credentials that can stand panic. We are of the view that making use of our autobiographic memory, especially episodic image memory, would make it feasible.
We will be able to offer 'Image-to-Text Converter cum Entropy Amplifier’ to citizens when Expanded Password System that we advocate becomes readily available to all the citizens. Install the converter software on the authentication server and the citizens who are naked, injured and panicked will be able to get themselves authenticated with little friction.
What is practicable in an extreme environment can be practiced in everyday environment, though the reverse is not true. Such an authentication system that copes with the panicked citizens can be operated for all the everyday applications, too, as a stand-alone authenticator, as a factor of multi-factor schemes and as the master password of ID federation schemes.